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I. introduction
1The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires all federal
agencies to consider the environmental impact of major regulatory decisions.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ensures that every element of food
and drugs used by people or animals is safe for use or consumption. Though the
FDA is obliged to follow NEPA's statutory mandates, it is not apparent that
the scope of the FDA's jurisdiction embraces areas that pose any threat to the
environment.
This paper examines the nature and extent of the FDA's interaction with NEPA
throughout the statute's thirty year history. From initial confusion over how
NEPA should actually aect the FDA's decision making to the current regula-
tory muddle over biotechnology, the FDA and NEPA have an extensive history.
When Congress rst passed the statute, the agency questioned whether it had
the authority or obligation to base decisions on environmental concerns revealed
through NEPA. That essential question pervades the FDA's interactions with
NEPA, as each major encounter between the FDA and NEPA demonstrate that
the FDA has never fully embraced the statute. While the FDA has complied
with legal obligations mandated by NEPA, the agency operates from the base-
line assumption that ensuring the safety of food and drugs has little to do with
the environment.
On its face, this assumption appears reasonable and prudent. The FDA's funda-
mental responsibility is the extensive health and safety review of anything that
may enter the American food or drug supply. To consider how the regulation
of food and drugs could impact the environment could distract the FDA from
2its primary mission. It is the goal of this paper to challenge these assumptions.
This paper examines a series of cases in which the regulatory decisions made by
the FDA did have a secondary impact, or potential eect on the environment.
Though certainly the exception rather than the rule, FDA decision making can
impact the environment. In addition to highlighting specic cases the FDA has
confronted, the paper also analyzes the regulatory framework which the FDA
has enacted to comply with NEPA, from its initial eorts in the early1970's
through the regulatory reform era of the late 1990's.
The paper proceeds in three parts. Part II provides an overview of NEPA. The
section examines the statutory text and foundational case law to understand how
the statute operates and the obligations it imposes on agencies. The section also
examines the legislative history of the statute to determine to what extent, if
any, Congress directly addressed the issue of how food safety or human health
could impact the environment. Part III examines the FDA and the statutes it
administers, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The purpose of the
section is to outline the scope of the agency's jurisdiction and highlight those
areas of jurisdiction where decision making could aect the environment.
In Part IV, the paper takes a largely historical approach to analyze how the
FDA and NEPA have interacted. In six major episodes, or `rounds,' the FDA has
confronted its obligations under NEPA. There are two categories of episodes:
those in which the FDA has taken steps, some more grudging than others,
to comply with NEPA and those in which NEPA could have played a more
extensive role in FDA decision making to identify or avoid environmental harm.
3Several of these six rounds have been independently addressed by academic
literature. This paper does not attempt to replicate the scope or detail of those
eorts. The principal intent of this paper is to compile all these episodes in one
place { to examine the FDA's interaction with NEPA holistically and to observe
change in attitudes and strategies through time.
II. THE POWER AND EXTENT OF NEPA
A. Introduction to the Statutory Text.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) is one of the most
important elements of federal legislation enacted to protect the environment.1
The statute has the potential to reach into every agency of the federal govern-
ment and alter that agency's behavior. Importantly, NEPA contains a broad
and powerful statement of Congressional policy to protect the environment and
to hold the government environmentally accountable for its actions. NEPA was
groundbreaking legislation for its time, passed before other well known environ-
mental statutes such as the Clean Air Amendments of 19702 and the Endangered
Species Act of 19733 and today remains a powerful tool for environmental pro-
tection.
NEPA is divided into two sections. Title I contains the broad statement of na-
tional environmental policy and the \action-forcing" components of the statute.4
1Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970); codied at 42 U.S.C. x4321-4370 (1999).
2Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); codied at 42 U.S.C. x7401-7671 (1999).
3Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884, (1973); codied at 16 U.S.C. x1131-1544 (1999).
4See Pub. L. No. 91-190 x101-105 (1970); Because most literature discussing NEPA refers
to the law in terms of the original statute, for consistency, the rest of the paper will refer to
4Title II establishes the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) which is the
regulatory body charged with overseeing NEPA implementation.5 Section 101
of NEPA contains a rather eloquent and extensive statement of national envi-
ronmental policy that identies many threats to the environment such as popu-
lation growth, resource exploitation and \expanding technological advances."6
The declaration further charges the federal government \to use all practica-
ble means and measures ...to create and maintain conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulll the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans."7 The tone
of this section continues to expound lofty goals by committing the government
to \fulll the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment
for succeeding generations ...[to] attain the widest range of benecial uses of
the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other unde-
sirable and unintended consequences."8 This part of the statute is commonly
referred to as substantive NEPA. However, despite the impressive language of
this national environmental policy, nothing in this section was drafted with any
binding legal force.
Section 102 of NEPA is often referred to as the \action-forcing" part of the
statute because it is the only part of NEPA that has any real bite in forcing the
government to comply with the policy laid out in Section 101. The section be-
gins by stating the directives that follow are to be complied with \to the fullest
NEPA's original sections rather than the codied version (i.e. NEPA xxx).
5See NEPA x201-209 (as amended by Pub. L. 94-52 x3, 89 Stat. 258 (1975)).
6NEPA x101(a).
7Id.
8NEPA x101(b)(1), (3).
5extent possible."9 The statute then, rather broadly, states that the policies,
regulations and laws of the country \shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies set forth in this Act."10 Section 102(2) of NEPA
lists several duties that \all agencies of the federal government"11 should take
to eectuate these goals. These obligations include: \utiliz[ing] a systematic
interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural
and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in de-
cisionmaking which may have an impact on the human environment;"12 and
\identify[ing] and develop[ing] methods and procedures.. which will insure that
presently unquantied environmental amenities and values may be given ap-
propriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and technical
considerations."13 Buried in this list, x102(2)(c) requires the federal government
to:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions signicantly aecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible ocial on { (i) the envi-
ronmental impact of the proposed action; (ii) any adverse environmental eects
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives
to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented....14
This part of the statute is often referred to as procedural NEPA as it di-
rects federal agencies to undertake a series of procedures, the most signicant of
9NEPA x102. This language was crucial for Congress to emphasize that the duties imposed
by NEPA were not to be avoided except under the most exceptional circumstances. See section
II.C., infra.
10NEPA x102(1).
11NEPA x102(2) (emphasis added).
12NEPA x102(2)(a).
13NEPA x102(2)(b); see also NEPA x102(2)(d)-(g).
14NEPA x102(2)(c); codied at 42 U.S.C. x4332(2)(C).
6which is the ling of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in conjunction
with any major federal action which aects the human environment. The in-
terpretation and extent of these obligations have been the subject of enormous
volumes of litigation and continues to be the subject of controversy today.15
The operation of procedural NEPA will be discussed in more detail below in
conjunction with the regulations promulgated by the CEQ.
Section 103 directs that every agency in the federal government create proce-
dures and policies so that the agency may comply with the procedural strictures
of NEPA.16 The regulations promulgated by the FDA have been the subject of
controversy as will be discussed below.17
Title II establishes the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)18
which is responsible for submitting an annual Environmental Quality Report
to Congress.19 The Council must carry out similar administrative reporting
tasks such as gathering information on environmental trends,20 reviewing fed-
eral government programs for compliance with NEPA's substantive goals,21 and
recommending further policy enhancements to improve environmental quality.22
However, the CEQ's most important functions were created by a series of ex-
ecutive orders which gave the CEQ authority to promulgate NEPA regulations
15For example, a 1995 survey of major NEPA cases revealed 45 signicant decisions handed
down by federal District and Circuit courts for that year alone. See William M. Cohen, Fran
Moneski, NEPA Court Decision Survey, SA85/3 ALI-ABA 1323 (1996).
16NEPA x103.
17See section IV(B), infra.
18NEPA x202.
19NEPA x204(1).
20NEPA x204(2).
21NEPA x204(3).
22NEPA x204(4).
7to coordinate agency compliance with the statute.23 This authority resulted in
regulations that are designed to enact NEPA's procedural provisions.24 Com-
mentators have noted that while the CEQ's regulations themselves cannot have
any substantive eect on decision making, the regulations echo the substan-
tive elements of NEPA's provisions.25 While a detailed understanding of NEPA
procedures would be beyond the scope of this paper, a brief discussion of the
regulations will help clarify latter discussion.
As noted above, the procedures of section 102(2)(c) are the crucial element of
NEPA's mandate. Perhaps a simple method to understand NEPA procedures
is to examine the denitions of key terms from x102(2)(c). The statute states
the triggering conditions for NEPA procedures are \every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major federal action signicantly
aecting the quality of the human environment."26 While the rst condition of
\every recommendation or report on proposals for litigation" is self-explanatory,
as well as relatively narrow, the phrase \major federal action" has been the
subject of controversy and interpretation.27 However, the CEQ has interpreted
\major federal action" broadly to include \actions with eects that may be ma-
jor and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility."28
This denition categories federal action as including, \adoption of ocial pol-
icy ...adoption of formal plans ...adoption of programs ...approval of specic
23Executive Order 11514 (1970) as amended by Executive Order 11991 (1977).
24See 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (1978) (codied at 40 C.F.R. x1500-1508).
25See Lawrence R. Liebesman, The Council on Environmental Quality's Regulations to Implement the National Environmental Policy Act { Will They Further NEPA's Substantive Mandate,
10 Environmental L. Rep. 50039 (1980).
26NEPA x102(c).
27See e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979).
2840 C.F.R. x1508.18 (1999).
8projects."29 Similarly, the CEQ interprets \human environment" \comprehen-
sively to include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of
people with that environment."30 Thus according to these denitions, and in
practice, federal agencies must often abide by x102(c) of NEPA for most actions
they undertake. Projects with only economic and social eects are specically
excluded from triggering the preparation of an EIS.31 The heart of NEPA pro-
cess is the EIS itself. An EIS is the detailed written statement that incorporates
the elements listed in x102(2)(c) of NEPA.32 Typically, when conducting an ac-
tion that triggers x102(c), an agency will prepare an Environmental Assessment
(EA) before preparing a full blown EIS. An EA is a scaled down version of
an EIS that \briey provide[s] sucient evidence and analysis for determining
whether to prepare an EIS."33 If, after preparing an EA, the agency determines
that the action will not eect the environment in a signicant way, the agency
issues a Finding of No Signicant Impact (FONSI).34 Only if a FONSI is not
issued must the agency proceed to prepare a full EIS.35
B. Brief Overview of NEPA Case Law
The scope, accuracy and implications of EA's, FONSI's and EIS's are the
subject of most case law on NEPA. Initially, the issue that most agencies
29Id.
30Id. x1508.14.
31Id. For instance, IRS Revenue Rulings do not require the preparation of an EIS, but an
Army Corp of Engineers plan to build a dam does.
32Id. x1508.11.
33Id. x1508.9.
34Id. x1508.13.
35Id. x1508.12
9confronted was that once they had prepared an EIS, the agency was uncer-
tain what inuence the document's ndings must actually exert over decision-
making. The substantive sections of NEPA purport to set a high bar for envi-
ronmental responsibility, yet, as noted earlier, these provisions are not worded
in a way that gives them much legal eect.36 In an important early case,
Calvert Clis' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission,37
the court considered the dicult question of how much substance review NEPA
procedures require. At issue were regulations promulgated by the Atomic En-
ergy Commission which substantially limited the agency's ability to consider the
environmental eects of its actions, even after the preparation of an EIS.38 Judge
Skelly Wrights opinion rejected the Commission's rules, stressing that \Congress
did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger."39 The court stated that \NEPA
establishes environmental protection as an integral part of the Atomic Energy's
Commission's basic mandate. ...[I]t must itself take the initiative of consid-
ering environmental values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the
process...."40
The Supreme Court did not follow the lower court's invitation to read NEPA as
requiring a certain level of substantive review as part of its procedural require-
ments. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,41 the rst Supreme Court case to address this
issue fully, the Court denied a claim that the Department of Interior had an obli-
36See Bill Lockhart, NEPA: All Form, No Substance?, 14 J. Energy Nat. Resources & En-
vtl. L. 415 (1994).
37449 F. 2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
38Id. at 1116-17.
39Id. at 1114.
40Id. at 1119.
41427 U.S. 390 (1976).
10gation to conduct a regional EIS rather than separate EIS for individual coal
mining operations in the northern plain states. The Court rejected a balancing
test employed by the Court of Appeals to justify the regional EIS, holding that
\[a] court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and, by balanc-
ing of court-devised factors, determine a point during the germination process
...at which an impact statement should be prepared."42 The Court furthered
emphasized this principle in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
stating, \NEPA does set forth signicant substantive goals for the Nation, but is
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural."43 Thus NEPA's procedural
mandate remains a vital obligation of everyday agency action while the extent of
the statute's substantive component remains the subject of academic discussion
and litigation.44 Extensive litigation has formalized many of the other elements
of NEPA's procedural requirements.45.
An appreciation of the substance/procedure debate about NEPA is a necessary
backdrop to consider how beholden the FDA should be to the statute. The case
law demonstrates that courts have been left to ll in some gaps in the statute {
most importantly the balance between procedural and substantive obligations
under NEPA. There is no construction of these requirements, however, that
42Id. at 406.
43435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
44For an argument that NEPA does give federal agencies the authority to make substantive
environmental decision that otherwise would not be authorized by their organic statutes, see
Lockhart, supra.
45See e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (rening standing
doctrine for NEPA suits); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)
(dening the necessary extent of NEPA analysis); Marsh v. Oregon Resouces Council, 490
U.S. 360 (1989) (holding that arbitrary and capricious review applies to NEPA-mandated
EIS); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979) (dening the extent of what constitutes
major federal action)
11would categorically exempt the FDA from considering the eects of its actions
on the human environment.
C. Overview of the Legislative History of NEPA
The nal element in this brief tour of NEPA is to examine the legislative
history of the statute to see if it sheds any light on whether Congress was con-
cerned at all with the environmental eects of the regulation of foods and drugs
in enacting NEPA. That is, does the legislative history contain any indication
that Congress was specically worried about food safety, or human health, when
it enacted NEPA, or was Congress focusing more broadly on the environment
in general? Not surprisingly, the answer to this question appears to be that
Congress did not consider how the subject matter regulated by each agency
could eect the environment when enacting NEPA.
Given the sweeping nature of the NEPA statute, its legislative history yields
few clues as to the specics of Congressional intent.46 As an initial explanation,
it is interesting to note the original House Bill did not even contain the \action-
forcing" statutes of Title I, thus the House Committee reports do not discuss
the meaning of most of the actual legislation.47 The Conference reports and
Congressional Records, however, document Congress' commitment that NEPA
46Many treatises include a great deal of information on NEPA's legislative history. See e.g.,
Frank P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law, New York, M. Bender, 1999; Erica L. Dolgin,
Federal Environmental Law, St. Paul, West Pub. Co. (1974).
47Before conference the House passed H.R. 12549, 91st Cong. (1969), which only addressed
the creation of the CEQ. See also 115 Cong. Rec. 26572, 26582-3 (1969) (statement of
Representative Daddario).
12should apply to all agencies and that there should be no loopholes for compli-
ance. The conference report indicates that the statutory language that opens
x102(c) { \to the fullest extent possible" { should \make clear that each agency
of the federal government shall comply with the directives unless existing law
expressly prohibits or makes full compliance impossible."48 The report empha-
sizes that the phrase \to the fullest extent possible" shall not be used to avoid
compliance with x102 nor shall an agency use an excessively narrow construction
of its organic statute to avoid compliance with NEPA.49
Furthermore, there are indications that the substantive components of NEPA,
though lacking in legal force, was nevertheless important to Congress' design.
The phrase \fullest extent possible" was placed at the beginning of x102 so as
to apply to both the policy elements of x102(a)-(b) and (d)-(g) as well as the
procedural requirements of x102(c).50 The Senate on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs Committee Report accompanying the original Senate version of NEPA51
stressed that the statute was written to \provide all agencies with a legislative
mandate and a responsibility to consider the consequences of their actions on
the environment" throughout the decision making process.52 Certainly, this
legislative history indicates that while the decision-making process of the FDA
should implicate NEPA procedures and substantive guidelines, there is no indi-
cation that Congress intended to deal with particular environmental eects of
48H.R. Rep. No. 91-765 (1969) (reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 2768).
49Id.
50115 Cong. Rec. 40,418 (1969).
51S. 1075, 91st Cong. (1969).
52S. Rep. No. 91-296 at 14, (1969) (emphasis added).
13FDA actions and programs.
III. the scope of the fda and its impact on the
environment
A. Overview of the Food and Drug Administration
The scope of the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
is enormous. It is estimated that 25 cents of every dollar spent in America
goes towards a product regulated by the FDA.53 The Federal Food and Drug
Act was rst enacted in 1906,54 though the current statutes originated from
the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).55 Since then the
statute has been amended dozens of times with the most recent revisions in the
Modernization Act of 1997.56 Some form of the Food and Drug Administration
has existed, under various names and dierent departments since 1862.57 The
purpose of this section is not to describe the extensive history or institutional
structure of the FDA and the FDCA, but rather to sketch out the various
realms of jurisdiction for which the agency has responsibility. At rst glance, it
might not seem intuitive that decision making concerning these subject matters
could eect the environment. In fact, decisions in many areas of the FDA's
jurisdiction have a potentially profound environmental impact. As this section
will demonstrate, the FDA's organic statutes do not include any latitude to
53Lecture notes, Peter Barton Hutt, January 4, 1999.
54Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
5552 Stat. 1040 (1938), codied at 21 U.S.C. x301 et. seq. (1999).
56Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
57See Peter B. Hutt, A Historical Introduction, 45 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 17 (1990).
14consider environmental eects of the agency's decisions. Thus the burden falls
entirely on NEPA to ensure the agency considers the eects of its decisions
beyond health and safety. An understanding of how the FDA regulates the
various areas of its jurisdiction is necessary to appreciate the importance of the
relationship between NEPA and the FDA.
B. Principle Areas of the FDA's Jurisdiction.
One of the FDA's primary concerns is ensuring that food consumed by Amer-
icans is correctly labelled and unadulterated. The FDCA contains lengthy de-
nitions of these terms,58 which include everything from how nutritional informa-
tion must be presented59 to the safety requirements for dietary supplements.60
The FDA enforces these complex denitions by prohibiting the introduction
into interstate commerce of misbranded or adulterated foods.61 The clear focus
of these rules is to ensure that the food that reaches Americans tables is safe
for consumption62 and that is properly labeled as to contents,63 quantity,64 etc.
However, under these guidelines it is entirely possible for foods that meet the
FDA's criteria for safety and branding to have the potential to cause environ-
mental harm, in their production or growth. Genetically engineered food such
5821 U.S.C. x342 (denition of adulterated food); 21 U.S.C. x343 (denition of misbranded
food).
5921 U.S.C. x343(q).
6021 U.S.C. x342(f).
6121 U.S.C. x331(a) (misbranding); 21 U.S.C. x331(b) (adulteration).
62See 21 U.S.C. x342(a)(1) (denition of poisonous and unsanitary ingredients).
63See e.g., 21 U.S.C. x343(k) (requiring labeling of articial avoring, coloring, or preserva-
tives).
64See 21 U.S.C. x343(e)(2) (requiring quantity information on any packaged foods).
15as Bt Corn presents one such case.65
The regulation of drugs and medical devices is the other bulwark of the FDA's
responsibility. The FDCA employs the same mechanism of prohibiting adulter-
ation and misbranding as the primary means for regulating drugs.66 However,
the statutes add another requirement, which is that no drug may be introduced
into interstate commerce unless an application for a new drug is approved by the
FDA.67 These petitions, termed new drug applications (NDAs), are the mech-
anism by which the FDA reviews drugs for safety and eectiveness.68 Before a
manufacturer can even le an NDA, the product must be tested, rst on animals
and then on humans. But to conduct this testing the drug must typically travel
through interstate commerce to reach researchers at various institutions. Thus
the FDCA creates an exemption to allow these drugs into interstate commerce
for the purpose of investigation.69 This process, which the FDA oversees and
regulates, is known as the Investigational New Drug (IND) phase. The FDA
procedures for INDs and for NDAs do not consider questions external to the
eect on humans of the drug, such as where it comes from, how it is extracted,
and the sustainability of the resource. For the most part these concerns are of
no consequence since drug materials are either synthetic or derived from a com-
mon substances. The experience of the approval of taxol, a cancer ghting drug
derived from the Pacic Yew tree, however, demonstrates how the approval of
65See section IV(F), infra.
6621 U.S.C. x351 (adulterated drugs and devices), 21 U.S.C. x352 (misbranded drugs and
devices).
6721 U.S.C. x355(a).
6821 U.S.C. x355(b)(1)(A).
6921 U.S.C. x355(i).
16an NDA can have drastic environmental consequences.70
There are several other areas of the FDA's authority that present similar prob-
lems. For example, in addition to regulating drugs for human use, the FDA is
also in charge of regulating new animal drugs and animal feed.71 As expected,
the FDA is principally concerned with the safety and ecacy of those drugs on
the target animal, as well as any eects passed on to humans through the con-
sumption of those animals.72 The controversy over the approval of Recombinant
Bovine Somatotropin (rbST) demonstrates the clash between emerging genetic
technologies and fears that these technologies could harm the environment.73
Furthermore, even seemingly innocuous areas of the FDA's jurisdiction, such
as medical devices, may present environmental concerns. For instance, it seems
that part of the concern in enacting certain provisions of the Modernization Act
of 1997 was a potential clash with the EPA over the regulation of metered dose
inhalers (asthma inhalers).74 While the FDA has the incredible responsibility
of ensuring the safety for a mass of products that for the most part do not
involve environmental concerns, there is a discrete subset of cases which involve
the potential for environmental impact.75 It is in this area that the interaction
between the FDA and NEPA becomes particularly relevant. Part IV of this
paper will examine this interaction in detail.
70See section IV(C), infra.
7121 U.S.C. x360b.
7221 U.S.C. x360b (d)(2).
73See section IV(D), infra.
74See section IV(E), infra (controversy surrounding the chloroorcarbons (CFCs) used as
propellant in these devices).
75As its name implies the FDCA also contains rules for cosmetics similar to those for
food and drugs. See 21 U.S.C. x361-63. However, and perhaps not surprisingly, there is
little concern that the regulation of the cosmetic industry has the potential to have any real
environmental impact.
17iv. the interaction of the fda with nepa { an his-
torical approach
Within a few years of the passage of NEPA, the FDA confronted the rst in
a series of rounds of interaction with NEPA as the agency struggled to nd the
balance between complying with the statutory mandate of NEPA and fulll-
ing the agency's own organic mandate. The interaction between the FDA and
NEPA is a long and ongoing one. Several times the agency has promulgated and
revised regulations to comply with NEPA. Those regulations have been chal-
lenged in court. Other actions taken by the FDA such as the approval of drugs
or drug testing have been criticized or challenged in court. Even a Presidential
initiative enacting the Vice President's National Performance Review addressed
the issue of the extent of the interaction between the FDA and NEPA. Today
the fundamental questions { how much should the regulation of food and drugs
focus on the external environmental eects of those products and to what ex-
tent is NEPA the proper vehicle for enforcing that focus { remain unanswered.
The increasing prominence of the products of biotechnology in our food and
drug supply have only continued to highlight these issues. In one sense, the
interaction between the FDA and NEPA is merely a microcosm for a larger
regulatory problem revolving around the coordination of agencies and statutes
to regulate biotechnology. Also the FDA's various attempts to either comply
with or evade NEPA emphasize the inherent tension in NEPA itself between its
procedural mandates and its substantive goals. The FDA does conduct EAs and
18occasionally EISs { but what the agency continues to grapple with is the degree
to which the agency's decision-making must actually reect the results in those
documents. To understand the evolution of the relationship between the FDA
and NEPA, the paper progresses historically through rounds of controversies
between the agency and the statute.
A. Round 1: EDF v. Mathews
The FDA's rst attempt to address the requirements of NEPA came 3 years
after the statute's passage. The FDA promulgated regulations establishing pro-
cedures for preparation of environmental impact statements for major agency
actions signicantly aecting the environment.76 While these initial regulations
were themselves unremarkable, two years later the FDA issued its legal inter-
pretation of these regulations. In this interpretation, the FDA addressed one
of the fundamental questions head on by challenging the extent to which the
agency must take or refrain from action based on an adverse EIS to a proposed
action. A suit challenging the FDA's regulatory interpretation forced a court to
outline the extent to which an EIS must inuence the FDA's decision making.
The issue arose in the context of the FDA's approval of the use of plastic
bottles to package foods and soft drinks.77 In keeping with NEPA and the reg-
7621 C.F.R. Part 6 (1974), published in 38 Fed. Reg. 7001 (1973).
77The FDA has the authority to regulate the packaging of food based in part on 21 U.S.C.
x342(a)(6) which denes food as adultered \if its container is composed, in whole or in part,
of any poisonous or deleterious substance which may be render the contents injurious to
health," and in part on 21 U.S.C. x321(s) which includes in the denition of \food additive"
any substance \intended for use in producing, manufacturing,... packaging, transporting, or
19ulations promulgated by the FDA, the agency prepared an EIS studying the
environmental eects of the plastic bottles on the environment.78 The result of
the EIS indicated several adverse environmental eect of the plastic bottles, but
with no threat to human or safety from the plastic bottles identied, the FDA
was hesitant to refrain from approving the bottles.79 On the same day that the
EIS was published, the FDA issued a regulation interpreting its authority to
act under NEPA which the FDA gave immediate applicability { including the
results of the plastic bottle EIS.80 In brief, the regulation announced the FDA's
legal interpretation that an adverse EIS does not permit the FDA to act if the
adverse impact identied does not involve a threat to public health, adulter-
ation, or misbranding or some other factor already identied by the FDCA.81
The regulation states: \Although adverse environmental impacts relating to de-
struction of scenic beauty, depletion of energy resources, increase in litter and
trash.. are not condoned by the Commissioner [of the FDA], he has no legal au-
thority to prevent them."82 The agency implemented the ruling immediately as
nal agency action since the interpretation falls outside the scope of notice and
comment rulemaking.83 However, the agency almost invited a legal challenge
to the regulation stating \[i]t is the Commissioner's opinion that ...any person
[in this country] has standing to obtain judicial review of this regulation ..."84
holding food." Such substances must be evaluated scientically for their safety before they
can be used. Id.
78NEPA x102(2)(c), 21 C.F.R. Part 6 (1974).
79See Comment, NEPA's Power to Amend Other Federal Laws: EDF Seeks to Compel the FDA to Consider Environment Criteria,
5 Envtl. L. Rep. 10104 (1975).
80See id.
81Legal Eect of NEPA on Agency Action, 40 Fed. Reg. 16662-63 (1975).
82Id.
83Id.
84Id.
20The regulation contained a detailed justication for this determination. The
legal underpinning of the FDA's argument was that the FDCA prescribes spe-
cic criteria by which the agency may approve or deny the various applica-
tions and petitions for which the agency has responsibility.85 While NEPA
requires the FDA to prepare EISs, which may or may not reveal adverse eects
of agency action, NEPA \does not contain independent substantive legal au-
thority permitting or requiring the Commissioner to take or refrain from taking
any particular action on the basis of a determination of an adverse environmen-
tal impact."86 The FDA based its regulation on the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP I)
that Congress did not intend NEPA to repeal by implication any other federal
statute.87 The FDA believed that taking action based on the result of an ad-
verse EIS where no organic statutory justication existed for that action would
implicitly reject the organic statute. Thus unless the FDCA (or some others
statute administered by the FDA) itself prohibits the environmental impact
identied by the EIS, the FDA may not act on the basis of the EIS alone.88
The justication of the FDA is awed for several reasons. First, its reliance
on the rationale in SCRAP I is dubious because of the factual setting of that
case. SCRAP I was a suit by environmentalists challenging railroad rates that
placed a surcharge on recycled materials.89 The lower court granted the envi-
ronmentalists petition and enforced its holding by issuing an injunction against
85See Section III(B), supra.
8640 Fed. Reg. 16662.
87412 U.S. 669, 694 (1973).
8840 Fed. Reg. 16662.
89412 U.S. at 677.
21the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to suspend the rates.90 At issue
in the case was the court's power to issue the injunction, not the ICC's power
to take susbtantive action based on NEPA. The Supreme Court had previously
held in Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern Railway Co.91 that Congress, in
49 U.S.C. x15(7), had explicitly eliminated judicial power to issue injunctions
concerning railroad rates against the ICC. To allow a court to issue an injunction
in this case based on NEPA would explicitly contradict Arrow and 49 U.S.C.
section 15(7). The Court refused to read NEPA as implicitly repealing section
15(7).92 However, there is no such link between the FDA's actions and NEPA.
No statute explicitly forbids the FDA from taking or refraining from taking
action based on an adverse EIS. The FDA's attempt to read its own organic
statute in this manner seems strained at best. There is a qualitative dierence
between using NEPA to circumvent an explicit limitation on judicial power and
allowing NEPA to inform a broad class of decision making.
The FDA's narrow reading of its own statute as binding the agency to utilize
only statutorily mandated factors such as public health, adulteration, and mis-
branding in decision making is problematic. As discussed above, the legislative
history of NEPA indicates a clear intent to empower agencies to make decision
based on environmental criteria.93 Recall that the House conferees in their re-
port explicitly stated their intent that an agency should not use an excessively
narrow construction of its organic statute to avoid compliance with NEPA.94
90346 F. Supp. 189 (1972)
91372 U.S. 658, 667 (1963).
92412 U.S. at 694.
93See Section II(C), supra.
94See note 49, supra.
22Additionally, the FDA's reading of the FDCA potentially conicts with that of
its parent agency, at that time, Health and Education and Welfare (HEW).95
In complying with Section 103 of NEPA, HEW issued a report on the status
of its agencies compliance with NEPA. 96 The report states that \a review of
the authorizing legislation does not reveal any program in which we may not
impose appropriate conditions intended to eect compliance with the purpose
and provisions of [NEPA] ...The applicable authorizing statutes provide, in
vary terms, for the imposition of terms and conditions. This is not construed as
prohibiting the implementation of policies and procedures directed at avoiding
adverse environmental eects."97 While the full implications of that report on
the FDA are not clear, it cast doubt on the value of the FDA's interpretation.
In fact, one article written at the time suggested that the regulation was moti-
vated by the FDA's uncertainty on the issue and the agency was counting on a
court decision to clarify the agency's legal relationship to NEPA.98
That decision came in the form of suit brought by the Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF) challenging the regulation for violating NEPA. In EDF, Inc. v. Mathews,
the district court for the District of Columbia held that the regulation violated
NEPA.99 The decision relied heavily on Calvert Clis for the prospect that
federal agencies are compelled by NEPA to take environmental values into con-
95See 5 Envtl. L. Rep. 10104, note 79 supra.
96NEPA x103, 42 U.S.C. 4335 (1999) requires agencies to \review their present statutory
authority ...for the purpose of determining whether there are any deciencies or inconsis-
tencies therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of this Act
...."
97Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Administration of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, Part II, 816, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Dec.
1970, Serial No. 91-41 cited in 5 Envtl. L. Rep. 10104, note 79 supra.
985 Envtl. L. Rep. 10104, note 79 supra.
99410 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1976).
23sideration.100 The court tersely concludes, \we nd that NEPA provides the
FDA with supplementary authority to base its substantive decisions on all envi-
ronmental considerations including those not expressly identied in the FDCA
and the FDA's other statutes."101 The court purports to base its decision in the
legislative history, the statutory language, the holdings of the other courts, and
the constructions adopted by other federal agencies without actually expounding
those explanations.102 Addressing the issue of the extent of NEPA's substantive
power to eect agency decisions, the court quoted from Calvert Clis, \what
possible purpose could there be in requiring the `detailed statement' to be be-
fore the hearing boards if the boards are free to ignore entirely the contents of
the statement? NEPA was meant to do more than regulate the ow of papers
in the federal bureaucracy."103
Thus the rst major interaction between the FDA and NEPA added to the con-
tinuing challenge to dene the boundaries of NEPA's substantive power. The
decision of the district court was not appealed and the regulation was, therefore,
revoked.
B. Round 2: Implementing Regulations to Comply with
NEPA
In 1985, the FDA conducted a signicant revision of its regulations previ-
ously promulgated to comply with NEPA. The regulations are quite specic {
100Id. at 337.
101Id. at 338.
102Id.
103Id. at 339 (quoting Calvert Clis, 449 F.2d at 117).
24they address the details of when EA's and EIS should be prepared, how these
documents should be prepared, and what actions are categorically excluded
from requiring any NEPA analysis.104 The promulgation of the new nal rules
in 1985 were accompanied by an extensive document addressing many of the
comments made to the agency during the public comment period of the \no-
tice and comment rulemaking" procedure.105 The tone of the FDA's response
to the comments indicates that the lesson of EDF v. Mathews was well-heeded
and the FDA recognized its responsibility to conduct environmental investiga-
tions whenever the potential existed for agency action to aect the environment.
These new regulations also beneted from considerably more guidance from the
CEQ as was previously available since it was not until 1978 that the CEQ pro-
mulgating its regulations to coordinate compliance with NEPA.106 Though the
precise contours of the FDA regulations are not particularly instructive, three
areas of the regulations deserve focus. Those areas are when the FDA will con-
duct EAs, when it will conduct EISs, and what subject matter it categorically
excludes from consideration.
As a preliminary matter the FDA took deliberate steps to recognize the author-
ity and importance of NEPA. For instance, the regulations begin with a state-
ment of purpose that recognizes NEPA as the \national charter for protection,
restoration, and enhancement of the environment."107 The FDA recognized
that as a matter of policy, the agency's programs will be planned, developed,
10421 C.F.R. Part 25 (1986).
105NEPA, Policies and Procedures, 50 Fed. Reg. 16636 (1985).
10643 Fed. Reg. 56003 (Nov. 29, 1978) codied in 40 C.F.R. Part 1508.
10721 C.F.R. x25.1 (1986).
25and executed in a manner so as to \achieve the policies declared by NEPA and
required by the CEQ regulations to ensure responsible stewardship of the en-
vironment for present and future generations."108 The regulations emphasize
that NEPA planning is an integral part of the regulatory process and that the
NEPA process is initiated either when the agency begins action under its own
statutory authority or when an applicant or petitioner brings an action to the
FDA.109 The agency was also motivated by a desire to streamline the process
and reduce costs associated with NEPA while still remaining vigilant to adverse
environmental impacts.110
The FDA recognized that most of its actions will require the threshold de-
termination of environmental impact made by an EA. The regulations iden-
tify 19 categories of agency action that typically require the preparation of
an EA.111 Among those requirements are major recommendations or reports
made to Congress,112 research supported by contracts or grants,113 establish-
ment of labeling requirements,114 amendments to FDA regulations,115 arma-
tion of a food substance as generally recognized as safe,116 approval of NDAs
and INDs,117 and approval new animal drug applications.118 Note that not all
EAs must be prepared by the FDA itself. When one of the above actions are
108Id. at x25.5.
109Id. at x25.10.
11050 Fed. Reg. 16636.
111Id. at x25.22.
112Id. at x25.22(a)(1).
113Id. at x25.22(a)(5).
114Id. at x25.22(a)(6).
115Id. at x25.22(a)(7).
116Id. at x25.22(a)(12).
117Id. at x25.22(a)(14).
118Id. at x25.22(a)(17).
26requested by an applicant or petitioner, it is that person that must prepare
the EA.119 However, the FDA remains responsible for ensuring that the EAs
are accurate and for interpreting the results (i.e. whether to proceed with an
EIS or issue a FONSI).120 In promulgating these categories of actions requiring
an EA, the FDA rejected comments that suggested that many of these areas
are ones which could be categorically excluded from preparation of an EA.121
Most of these comments were directed at exempting the various forms of drug
applications and were likely from interested parties such as the drug manufac-
turers themselves seeking to expedite their own processes. The FDA responded
to these comments by emphasizing that in its experience these actions, such as
NDAs, in fact often require an EA.122 The true test of this statement was born
out in later controversies over such types of FDA action.123
In determining which types of agency action require the preparation of a com-
plete EIS, the FDA was more terse. Section 25.22 states, \There are no cat-
egories of agency actions which routinely signicantly aect the quality of the
human environment and which therefore ordinarily require the preparation of an
EIS."124 Of course, the agency's regulation requires preparation of an EIS when
an EA leads to a nding that an action may impact the environment125 or when
an agency ocial believes that an action under consideration may signicantly
119Id. at x25.22(b).
120Id. at x25.22(d).
12150 Fed. Reg. 16636.
122Id.
123See section IV(C), (D), infra.
12421 C.F.R. x25.22(a) (1986). This regulation, along with most of Part 25 of Title 21 of
the C.F.R., remains in eect today (though some subsection number have changed). See 21
C.F.R. x25.22(a) (1999).
12521 C.F.R. x25.22(b)(1).
27aect the environment.126 The FDA justied this regulation by stating that it
could not identify any classes of actions which would routinely require an EIS so
instead the agency left the determination to a case-by-case evaluation of EAs.127
Given the discussion of the areas of jurisdiction of the FDA discussed above,
this conclusion appears reasonable because the majority of FDA decisions have
no environmental impact. Furthermore, the regulation was surely motivated,
in part, by a desire not to impose on all applicants and petitioners before the
FDA the requirement of preparing a full EIS where an EA would suce, at least
initially, to assess the potential harm of their actions.
The third major category of actions which the FDA identied were those that
did not require any form environmental assessment. The CEQ regulations carve
out an exception from the normal requirements of NEPA for \categorical ex-
clusions." A categorical exclusion is a category of major federal action that
\do[es] not individually or cumulatively have a signicant eect on the envi-
ronment."128 Any agency creating categorical exclusions must identify specic
criteria to explain why those actions do not require any environmental analy-
sis.129 The FDA regulations identify several dozen categorical exclusions which
touch on most areas of the FDA's jurisdiction.130 The specic categorical exclu-
126Id. at x25.22(b)(2).
12750 Fed. Reg. 16636.
12840 C.F.R. x1508.4 (1999).
129Id. at x1507.3(b)(2).
130For example, 21 C.F.R. x25.24(a) (general areas such as routine administrative actions,
maintenance of FDA facilities, enforcement actions, and promulgation of laboratory proce-
dures); id. at x25.24(b) (food areas such as testing batches of color additives and promulgat-
ing interim food additive regulation); id. at x25.24(c) (drugs and biologics such as amending
a NDA under certain conditions, testing batches of antibiotics, and certain INDs where all
waste will be controlled or non-toxic); id.at x25.24(d) (animal drugs); id.at x25.24(e) (devices
and medical products).
28sions do not cover areas which are particularly controversial.131 The categorical
exclusions themselves are broken into a few classes of justication for their sta-
tus as categorical exclusions. The FDA defends one of those classes as meriting
categorical exclusion because the actions involved \will not result in the pro-
duction or distribution of any substance, and therefore will not result in the
introduction of any substance into the environment."132 This justication is
noteworthy because it is entirely output oriented. The FDA, throughout its
listing of categorical exclusions, exempts actions that will not produce harmful
by-products. But the FDA does not consider the possibility that these actions
may have environmental aects before production { i.e. input oriented.133
With this background on how the FDA actually implements NEPA, the
paper will examine several more recent interactions of the agency and the statute
in the confusing era of genetic technology and governmental modernization. The
next section will demonstrate that occasionally the inputs in the process are
those that impact the environment.
C. Round 3: The Pacic Yew and the Taxol Controversy
The interaction between the FDA and NEPA is inevitably complicated by
the involvement of other federal agencies in a particular action. The experience
131E.g. it is dicult to argue that the replacement of window on a facility controlled by the
FDA warrants an EA. See 21 C.F.R. x25.24(a)(12)(i).
13221 C.F.R. x25.24.
133Certainly, this is not intended as a stinging criticism since the FDA can override the cate-
gorical exclusion of any particular action should the FDA believe the action may signicantly
aect the environment. See 21 C.F.R. x25.23(b). However, as a structural point, it highlights
the focus and attention of the agency.
29of the development of the cancer drug taxol from the Pacic Yew tree engaged
the FDA in a process that involved the National Forest Service, the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM), the National Cancer Institute (NCI), as well as
private industry. The challenge of developing a potentially life-saving drug im-
plicated various areas of each agency's expertise and jurisdiction and yet the
environmental impact from all these agencies actions involved the same con-
cern { the depletion of the Pacic Yew tree. The experience of the FDA with
the Pacic Yew was not one that required litigation or legislation to resolve.
Ultimately, the agencies coordinated their eorts to produce an EIS that hope-
fully informed at least the FDA's decision making. The story of taxol is useful
because it outlines the complexities of administering NEPA in a multi-agency
setting and demonstrates how the FDA responded to that challenge.
The Pacic Yew tree is an essential yet non-dominant component of the old
growth forests of the Pacic Northwest.134 The tree ranges from southern
Alaska down to central California and east to northern Idaho and Montana.
However, the yew only occurs in approximately 2.5 million acres of the 85 mil-
lion acres of commercial forest in the Pacic Northwest forests in the lower 48
states. Satellite imagery estimates that there are approximately 130 million yew
trees in Oregon and Washington on Forest Service Land.135
134See Douglas O. Heiken, The Pacic Yew and Taxol: Federal Management of an Emerging Resource,
7 J. Envtl. L. and Litig. 175 (1992). The following discussion (section IV(C)) draws almost
exclusively from this article which was the most comprehensive on the subject. I do not wish
to give the impression that I have done the original research on this issue. Rather than cite
every fact in this section to this article, I will highlight the original documents, which I have
examined, that are particularly relevant to this subject. Summarizing Heiken's article is still
useful because I have extracted from it principally the experience of the FDA in managing
the resource according the NEPA's procedures.
135See Heiken, supra note 134, at 179-85.
30As early as 1967, the National Cancer Institute (NCI) discovered that an extract
from the bark of the yew, called taxol, was eective in ghting cancer. By 1991,
the substance was in late phase clinical trials for ovarian and breast cancer. NCI
and Bristol-Myers Squibb entered into an agreement to coordinate research on
taxol.136 The FDA was involved in these procedures in approving the IND that
regulates clinical trials on human beings.137 While the discussion above empha-
sized that the FDA only considers the health and safety eects of the potential
drug on human beings,138 in the case of taxol there is enormous externality to
that limitation. That externality is the fact that taxol's primary (and currently
only) source is yew tree bark. Before 1991, approximately 200,000 pounds of
bark had been harvested from the forests of Washington and Oregon for drug
investigation pruposes. But when taxol entered the more advanced phases of
research the NCI and Bristol-Myers estimated needing 750,000 pounds of bark
annually and, in fact, the harvest in 1991 was estimated at 825,000 pounds.
Heiken estimates that to supply this quantity of yew bark would require ap-
proximately 95,000 mature, harvestable yew trees annually.139
The bulk of the responsibility for managing this resource belongs with the For-
est Service or the BLM, on whose land the yew trees grow, and so the NCI and
136Opportunity for a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement for the Scientic and Commercial Development of Taxol as an Anticancer Agent,
54 Fed Reg. 31733 (1989).
137See 21 C.F.R. x312.40 (1999) which sets out the procedures by which an investigational
new drug may be used in a clinical trial; 21 C.F.R. x312.21 regulates the phases of clinical
trials once an IND has been approved. The rst phase involves laboratory testing of the drug.
Phases II and III involve clinical trials on humans which increase scope and size.
138See Section III(B), supra.
139While this may seem meager compared to the 130 million tree population estimate, it is
far more daunting when taken in context with evidence that most of these trees are either too
old or too young to harvest and that it takes between 14-50 years for a yew to add one inch
of diameter (harvestable trees are about 10 inches in diameter). See Heiken, supra note 134,
at 189-92.
31Bristol-Myers must seek these agencies approval to harvest the trees. However,
each approval of an IND by the FDA makes this harvesting possible. Further-
more, should researchers develop any alternatives to yew bark as a source for
taxol, the FDA would need to approve those alternatives through an IND be-
fore clinical study could begin. Heinkin emphasizes that NEPA should have
been the vehicle for informing decision making by FDA (and the other federal
agencies) to examine these problems. Yet the FDA never prepared an EIS in
conjunction with the IND for taxol from yew bark.140 Neither the NCI nor
Bristol Meyer submitted an EA in conjunction with their IND, but the FDA's
own regulations place some responsibility on itself to identify those situations
where an EIS would be necessary. Certainly, a proposed drug investigation that
calls for the removal of 750,000 pounds of bark from a single tree species \may
signicantly aect the quality of the human environment." The blame lies not
solely with the FDA { until 1991 no federal agency even agreed to prepare an
EIS in conjunction with taxol.141 Nevertheless, despite the early failings of these
agencies to prepare an EIS, the process eventually got underway.
The FDA's role in the EIS was as a cooperating agency. The scope of the EIS
was much more within the realm of expertise of the Forest Service, but by acting
as a cooperating agency, the FDA would be able to incorporate by reference the
ndings of the EIS as well as contribute in any useful manner. At the time of
140Recall that most INDs are subject to categorical exclusion under 21 C.F.R. x25.24(c)(4).
However, arguably the exception to this rule found at x25.23(b) that overrides the categorical
exclusion if the proposed action would signicantly impact the environment should have been
applied. Furthermore, at the very least each IND application must include a \claim for cate-
gorical exclusion ...or an EA," id. x312.23(a)(7)(iv)(e). Heiken asserts that no environmental
documentation accompanied the INDs.
141The Forest Service issued a revised notice of intent to prepare an EIS on the Pacic yew
harvest in early 1992. See 57 Fed. Reg. 5245 (Feb. 13, 1992).
32the publication of Heiken's article the EIS had not yet been published but he
criticizes the alternatives under consideration at the time by the agencies.142
The alternatives proposed at the time dealt with various methods and amounts
of actual harvest of the yew { none of these alternative are policy choices within
the jurisdiction of the FDA. Heiken states that there were alternatives involv-
ing deriving taxol from sources other than yew bark, such as the yew needles or
partial synthesis, that should have been addressed as part of the discussion of
alternatives mandated by NEPA. Because these alternative sources would have
required INDs they would have empowered the FDA to contribute meaningfully
to the decision making process.143
Despite the obvious failings of the FDA and other federal agencies to follow
NEPA procedures for a project with serious environmental consequences, no
suit was brought in conjunction with these agency actions. The EIS prepared
by the Forest Service was released in November of 1993.144 The FDA began
to follow NEPA procedures when it issued a FONSI for EAs received in con-
junction with a NDA for taxol.145 Several years later, the FDA issued a notice
that required all applications for NDAs or INDs involving taxol to prepare EAs
which must identify the sources of the Pacic yew that will be harvested to
supply the taxol.146
142Among the requirements of an EIS, 40 C.F.R. x1502.14 (1999) includes, \a pre-
sentation, in comparative form, of the environmental impacts of the proposal and
all reasonable alternatives; the agency preferred alternative; a no-action alternative; and ap-
propriate mitigation measures" (emphasis added).
143See Heiken, supra note 134, at 191-95, 227-29.
144See Notice: EIS Availability, 58 Fed. Reg. 52485 (1993).
145Taxol, EAs and FONSI, 58 Fed. Reg. 3954 (1993).
146Paclitaxel Drug Products, Environmental Information Needed in New Drug Applications, Abbreviated New Drug Applications, and Investigational New Drug Applications,
61 Fed. Reg. 58694 (1996).
33The experience of the FDA with taxol demonstrates how slowly it can take
agencies to respond to new circumstances. The FDA was unfamiliar with the
concept that the development of a drug could impact the environment. But
NEPA eventually was heeded and did its job { the Forest Service prepared an
EIS which could be referenced by the involved agencies and the FDA now re-
quires any action involving the Pacic yew to include an EA. The interaction
between NEPA and the FDA with taxol was ultimately a success in so far as
the process eventually worked to protect the yew tree, but whether the FDA
adjusted its institutional thinking to acknowledge that drug innovations can
impact the environment is less certain.
D. Round 4: Stuaber v. Shalala and the Controversy Over
rbST
The next signicant interaction between the FDA and NEPA arose over the
FDA's controversial approval of recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST) { a
genetically engineered cow hormone that increases milk production. A lawsuit
again forced a court to evaluate whether the agency had fullled its obligations
under NEPA. The controversy over rbST, however, is not primarily a conict
between the FDA and NEPA. Rather, the controversy involves the much broader
question of how various agencies should regulate biotechnological products and
how to balance the potential risks and benets of these technologies. As the
rst major agricultural product created by biotechnology, rbST has been the
focus of a great deal of research, criticism, and concern. Use of the hormone
34became a major controversy in the battle over biotechnology generally. This
section will focus only on the small role that NEPA played or could have played
in shaping the FDA's regulation of rbST.
In the 1930's, research demonstrated that cows injected with bovine soma-
totropin (bST), a naturally occuring hormone in cows, produced more milk
than untreated cows.147 In the 1980's, with the advent of new genetic technolo-
gies, researchers were able to isolate the gene that produces bST and produce
it commercially for large scale usage.148 The technology used involves splicing
the cow's bST into the DNA of an E. coli bacteria.149 That bacteria can then
be grown in fermentation tanks, producing vast quantities of the new synthetic
hormone (rbST).150 When this hormone is injected into cows, milk production
is increased by an average of 12 percent.151
As an animal drug, rbST falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the FDA.
Before rbST can be used commercially, the FDA must approve an new ani-
mal drug application to ensure the safety of the product both for animals and
for humans.152 The hormone presented several potential risks. For the cows,
rbST increases the risks of reduced pregnancy rates, ovarian cysts, uterine dis-
orders, and decreased gestation periods and lower birth weight for calves.153
The hormone also may cause increased bovine body temperatures, indigestion,
147See Elie Gendlo, Stauber v. Shalala: Are Environmental Challenges to Biotechnology Too Dicult?,
4 Wis. Envtl. L. J. 41, 44 (1997).
148Id.
149See David Aboulaa, Pushing rbST: How the Law and the Political Process Were Used to Sell Recomninant Bovine Somatotropin to America,
15 Pace Envtl. Rev. 603, 605 (1998).
150Id.
151See Karen G. Herman, Issues in the Regulation of Bioengineered Food, 7 High Tech. L.
J. 107, 112 (1992).
152See Section III(B) supra.
153See Stuaber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp 1178, 1183 (W.D. Wis 1995)
35bloating, diarrhea, enlarged hocks, hoof rot, enlarged lesions and injection site
swelling.154 Additionally, rbST increases the risk of mastitis, a bacterial infec-
tion of the udder which requires treatment by antibiotics to keep milk edible by
humans.155
There are two direct health risks posed by rbST in humans. The growth
hormone gets passed into the cow milk and therefore is directly ingested by
humans. However, there is evidence that rbST breaks down quickly in human
stomachs and the hormone is not active in humans.156 The other direct risk
posed by rbST is that it stimulates the production of another hormone, insulin-
like growth factor (IGF-1) which gets passed on in increased levels to milk.157
This hormone is active in humans and it is not destroyed by pasteurization.158
Short-term laboratory studies on rats have indicated that there are may be
negative eects on the digestion system by IGF-1. Finally, there is an indirect
risk posed by rbST. Because rbST increases the risk for mastitis, there is a
greater risk that the antibiotics used to treat the disease will end up in milk.159
But state and local governments already regulate milk for antibiotic presence
and so this issue went largely unaddressed by the FDA.160
The FDA evaluated all of these forms of risk and determined that any risk
154Id.
155Id.
156See Gendlo, supra note 147, at 45.
157Id.
158Id.
159Id.
160Id. For a more detailed discussion of the potential health risks of rbST, see Aboulaa,
supra note 149, at 626-40.
36was manageable and not severe enough to deny approval. In its study and eval-
uation of the health risks to cows, the FDA concluded that the risk to cattle
was manageable and the NIH reported that the eects of rbST on dairy cows
appeared to be minimal.161 Similarly, the FDA concluded that there was only
a very slight increase in the occurrence of mastitis in cows.162 However, there
is substantial disagreement over how severe this risk actually is.163 The FDA
determined that rbST was safe for human consumption and did not even re-
quire Monsanto, the primary manufacturer of rbST to develop a testing regime
to detect the actual amount of residue in milk.164 In examining the potential
eects of IGF-1, the FDA concluded that there was no evidence that IGF-1
harms humans at all and the substance is simply digested.165 Further, the ac-
tual level of the hormone is similar to that found in human milk.166 Finally,
as noted above, the FDA relied on existing state and local regulatory systems
for testing for antibiotics in milk to ensure that the milk supply is free from
antibiotic residues.167 Given the results of its testing, the FDA concluded that
the milk from rbST cows was essentially the same as that from untreated cows
and approved the use of rbST in dairy cows in late 1993.168
161See Aboulaa, supra note 149, at 622.
162Id.
163Other sources including the General Accounting Oce and private studies found the
incidence of mastitis to be substantially higher and perhaps somewhere between a seventy-
nine and nineteen percent increase. See Aboulaa, supra note 149, at 627.
164Id. at 614.
165Id. at 633. Again, this conclusion has been contested by various studies not conducted
by the FDA. Other studies found evidence of risk of cancer, fetal development, renal eects,
and interacting with other human diseases. See id. at 634.
166Id.
167Id. at 631.
168Id. at 615. There is much more `behind the scenes' in the approval of rbST including
controversies over labelling, improper inuences within the agency, and Congressional studies.
For a detailed, yet critical, history of the FDA's experience in studying, approving, and
regulating rbST, see generally, id.
37It is within the context of the widespread use of a drug that the FDA concluded
was safe for use but that some feared was harmful or insuciently studied that
consumers brought a suit against the FDA, challenging its approval of rbST. In
Stauber v. Shalala, consumers challenged the FDA's approval of rbST on three
grounds: 1) the FDA did not consider the health and safety issues related to
the use of rbST, 2) the FDA failed to require mandatory labeling of products
with milk from cows treated with rbST, and 3) the FDA failed to conduct an
adequate EA or EIS to determine the environmental impact of rbST.169 The
rst two claims are based on alleged violations of the FDCA itself by the FDA
for not adequately applying its own safety criteria to the approval process. The
third claim is, obviously, a NEPA challenge to the approval. On the rst claim,
the district court found that the FDA properly considered the health and safety
eects on both cows and humans.170 The court held that while the consumer-
plaintis were able to point to studies that disagree with the FDA results, FDA
review did not fail the deferential arbitrary and capricious review standard.171
In its opinion, the court emphasized that the FDA is not required to nd rbST
safe at a \zero-risk" threshold, although it stated some doubts about the \man-
ageable risk approach."172 The court also found that the plaintis labeling
claim was without merit.173 The FDA's approach did not required labeling for
products with rbST milk and further required that products with non-rbST milk
169Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
170Id. at 1191.
171Id.
172Id. at 1191-92.
173Id. at 1193.
38not be labeled `growth hormone free' without a disclaimer.174 The court held
that these decisions were rational under the statute175 and survive arbitrary
and capricious review.176
The plaintis' NEPA claim involved three alleged violations including a novel
requirement that the FDA consider the socioeconomic eects of the product in
its environmental review. When Monsanto applied for an NDA it submitted an
EA, as required by FDA regulations. In response to that EA, the FDA issued a
FONSI.177 The environmental assessment, the content and scope for which the
agency assumed responsibility, concluded that rbST would not aect land use
patterns or structural trends in the dairy market.178 The EA and FONSI also
found that there were no environmental impacts concerning the biotechnological
aspects of the drug's production.179 However, neither the EA nor the FONSI
addressed the human health concerns raised by the potential for IGF-1 residue
or antibiotic residue.180 The EA and FONSI also failed to address a number of
alternatives to approval, such as delaying approval for more study or approving
a lower dose. The plaintis' NEPA claim focuses on these two omissions as well
as a third one. The plaintis' alleged that NEPA requires the FDA's EA to
address the socioeconomic eects of rbST on dairy farmers.181
174For example, a recently produced yogurt container had the following language, \We oppose
rGBH (synthetic Bovine Growth Hormone [rbST]). The family farmers who supply our milk
and cream pledge not to treat their cows with rBGH. According to the FDA, no signicant
dierence has been shown, and no test can no distinguish between milk from rGBH treated
cows and untreated cows."
17521 U.S.C. x343(a)(1) (prohibited misleading labeling) and 21 U.S.C. x321(n) dening
labeling requirements for advertising purposes.
176Stauber, 895 F. Supp at 1193.
177Id. at 1186.
178Id.
179Id.
180Id.
181Id. at 1194.
39The extent to which NEPA requires agencies to examine the socioeconomic im-
pacts is closely tied to the question of whether NEPA requires an examination
of health eects. Several cases before Stauber have traced the contours of a `so-
cioeconomic eects' doctrine.182 The `rule' is that socioeconomic eects need
only be considered by an EIS when there is enough primary evidence of other
environmental impacts to trigger an EIS.183 In his article Dougherty argues
that this `rule' is somewhat inconsistent with NEPA's requirement to examine
human health eects.184 Dougherty points to NEPA's legislative history which
discusses the importance of the right to a healthful human environment to sup-
port this claim.185 Thus the FDA's obligation to consider the socioeconomic
eects of rbST could be linked to the FDA's obligation to consider human health
eects under NEPA.
The decision in Stauber demonstrates the limitations of NEPA in regulating
products whose main `environmental' concerns overlap directly with the con-
cerns of the FDA's statutory mandate. The court found that the FDA was
not required to issue an EIS on the health eects of rbST because the FDA
already had evaluated health and safety eects in its review of the NDA.186 In
so holding, the court relied on regulations promulgated by the CEQ which al-
lows agencies to combine another agency document with NEPA, to fully satisfy
NEPA.187 When the `environmental' concerns to be addressed by an EA or EIS
182See James B. Dougherty, The Application of NEPA to Agency Actions Aecting Human Health,
13 Envtl. L. Rep. 10179, fn. 30 (1983) (listing cases).
183See id. at *7.
184Id.
185Id at *3-*4
186Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1195.
187Id.; see 40 C.F.R. x1506.4 (1999).
40are the human health eects of a project, the FDA's own processes are sucient
to evaluate these issues without reliance on NEPA. The court held that requir-
ing the EA itself to contain the health and safety information from the FDA's
studies in response to the NDA would amount to simple paperwork duplication
and not advance NEPA's substantive goals.188 The court atly rejects, there-
fore, the claim that an EIS is required to consider the socioeconomic eects of
rbST because there is no link to any other independent grounds for an EIS.189
Put simply, socioeconomic eects on their own are not enough to trigger NEPA.
This holding is based both on regulations promulgated by the CEQ describing
this interrelatedness requirement and by the FDA excepting pure socioeconomic
eects from EAs.190
The decision in Stauber spurred a great deal of analysis of the entire process of
the approval of rbST, as well as the general regulatory framework surrounding
the control of biotechnology products. Because of the overlap between NEPA's
human health mandate and that of the FDA, Stauber indicates that NEPA
might not be the most successful mechanism to ensure that certain environ-
mental concerns, including human health, are independently examined by FDA
decision making. The next section will examine eorts to clarify an increasingly
complex regulatory environment before the following section returns to the issue
of the FDA, NEPA and biotechnology.
188Stauber, 895 F. Supp. at 1196.
189Id. at 1194.
190Id.; see 40 C.F.R. x1508.14 (1999); 50 Fed. Reg. 16636 (1985).
41E. Round 5: Regulatory Reform and the FDCA Modern-
ization Act of 1997
In 1997, Congress enacted signicant revisions to the entire FDCA, collec-
tively entitled the Modernization Act of 1997.191 The revisions touched upon
every aspect of the FDA's regulation of food, drugs, and all the other areas
of its jurisdiction. Section 411 of the act states, \not withstanding any other
provision of law, an environmental impact statement prepared in accordance
with the FDA regulations in 21 C.F.R. Part 25 shall be considered to meet the
requirements for a detailed statement under section 102(2)(c) of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969."192 The meaning behind this somewhat
cryptic provision is not apparent unless viewed in a larger context of regula-
tory reform. In 1995, as part of implementing Vice President Gore's National
Performance Review, President Clinton issued initiates that were designed to
streamline the FDA's regulatory policies. In 1997 (before the Modernization
Act), in response to those initiatives, the FDA amended its regulations govern-
ing compliance with NEPA. This section will examine each of these steps to
analyze how regulatory reform has altered the relationship between the FDA
and NEPA.
In 1993, Vice President Al Gore undertook a major review of the administra-
tion of the federal government in an eort to reduce needless expenditures and
improve functioning of bureaucracies. The project involved each cabinet depart-
ment and 10 agencies, examining every aspect of how the government conducts
191Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296-2380 (1997) (\Modernization Act").
192Modernization Act x411; 111 Stat. 2373 (1997); 21 U.S.C. x746 (1999).
42itself, from procurement to spending, reporting, employee management, cus-
tomer service and productivity. The result of this investigation was a report
present by the Vice President, entitled the National Performance Review.193
The entire National Performance Review involved several volumes, including
explanations of recommendations for each department or agency. The direct
recommendations for the FDA involved integrating the two agencies responsi-
ble for food safety and allowing the FDA to collect fees for its inspection and
approval processes for food, drugs, and devices.194 As a separate part of Vice
President Gore's reinventing government initiative, the FDA undertook a com-
prehensive review of its own procedures and administration.195
One of the recommendations that emerged from that process was an initiative
to reduce the burden of EAs on the approval process of food and drugs. The
initiative stated that its goals were to accelerate the approval process of food
and drug review and to bring products to the market sooner without sacric-
ing safety or quality.196 In overviewing the major regulatory reform initiatives,
the report recommended, \[e]xcluding drug and biologic manufacturers from
requirements for most environmental assessments, which currently cost tens of
thousands of dollars each time a new product is developed yet provide no real
benet to the environment."197 The report states that while EAs cost between
193Al Gore, Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less, National Perfor-
mance Review, Washington, D.C. (1993) (National Performance Review).
194Id. at 141.
195Bill Clinton & Al Gore, Reinventing Drug and Medical Device Regulations, National Per-
formance Review, Washington, D.C. (1995). The FDA references a similar companion,
Reinventing Food Regulations (1996), however, this volume was not listed or available any-
where in the Harvard University Library System. See 62 Fed. Reg. 40570 (1997).
196Id. at 2-4.
197Id. at 5.
43forty and one hundred and fty thousand dollars each, virtually all of them
result in the FDA issuing a FONSI.198 Thus the report recommends increasing
the number of categorical exclusions from the EA and EIS requirements man-
dated by NEPA and CEQ. To justify this initiative, the report declares, \[t]he
FDA believes that nearly all product approvals will qualify for categorical ex-
clusion. For example, virtually all drug approvals would result in only minute
releases of the drug into the environment as a result of human use and such
releases would not be environmentally signicant.199 The report recognizes the
FDA's experience with taxol, but concludes that in such circumstances an EA
or EIS should be prepared through an \extraordinary circumstance" exception
to FDA regulations.200 Tellingly, the stated impacts of these recommendations
are \substantially benet[ing] industry and ...improv[ing] regulatory eciency
without having any adverse impact on public health or the environment. Indus-
try would save [the costs] on each EA."201 Thus as a result of a project designed
to \treat taxpayer dollars with respect,"202 the FDA committed to initiatives
designed to reduce the burden of complying with federal law in order to save
private industry money.
In response to these initiatives, the FDA undertook a major revision of its reg-
ulations that govern NEPA compliance. After notice and comment rulemaking,
those regulations were nalized in July of 1997.203 The most signicant change
198Id. at 14.
199Id.
200Id.
201Id. at 15
202National Performance Review, supra note 193, at 2.
203NEPA, Revision of Policies and Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 40570 (1997).
44in the rules is perhaps the tone underlying those rules. Echoing the need to
reduce regulatory hurdles, the introduction to the rule states, the regulation
\increases the eciency of the agency's implementation of NEPA by substan-
tially reducing the number of EAs required to be submitted by industry and
reviewed by FDA and by providing for categorical exclusions for additional
classes of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a signicant
impact on the human environment. This nal rule also makes the regulations
more concise and useful to the public and regulated industry."204 This tone
shift is born out by subtle rewording of the introductory regulation. The former
purpose section began by invoking NEPA as \the national charter for protec-
tion, restoration, and enhancement of the environment."205 The new purpose
section merely begins, \[NEPA] directs that to the fullest extent possible, the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in NEPA. All agen-
cies ...shall comply with the procedures in [NEPA] except where compliance
would be inconsistent with other statutory requirements."206 It remains to be
seen whether placing paramount emphasis on eciency and simplicity will still
serve the environmental goals NEPA was meant to protect.
With respect to the categories of actions that would normally require an EA, a
side by side comparison of the old regulations to the new ones do not reveal large
discrepancies. The only three categories eliminated by the new regulations are
204Id.
20521 C.F.R. x25.1 (1985); see Section IV(B) supra.
20621 C.F.R. x25.1 (1997). Note how this tone echoes the FDA's interpretation of NEPA
overturned in EDF v. Mathews.
45the regulations relating to the control of communicable diseases, the approval
of antibiotic application, and the approval and issuance of licenses for biological
products.207 Of these categories that no longer require an EA, the broadest in
scope appears to be the approval and licensing of biological products.208 The
FDA regulates biological products under the Public Health Services Act.209 The
Act denes biological products as including viruses, therapeutic serum, toxin,
antitoxin, vaccine, blood, or blood component.210 The Act primarily regulates
the movement and labeling of these materials.211 Too little time has elapsed to
see how these omissions could aect FDA decision making. Nor is it clear what
environmental impact would result from any of these three categories of actions
now that the industry or the agency may engage in these actions without rst
producing an EA.
The other signicant category missing from the new regulations is a \catch
all" provision that requires an EA for any other action not listed that might
impact the environment.212 However, the FDA's response to comments on that
omission was that new section 25.21 obviates the need for a \catch all."213 It
is yet unclear how often and under what circumstances the \extraordinary cir-
cumstances" clause will be invoked. In fact, one comment to the regulation
207Compare 21 C.F.R x25.20 (1997) with 21 C.F.R. x25.22(a)(13), (15), (16) (1985).
20821 C.F.R. x25.22(16) (1985).
209See 42 U.S.C. x262 (1999) (regulation of biological products).
210Id. x262(a).
211Id.
21221 C.F.R. x25.22(a)(19) (1985).
213See 62 Fed. Reg. at 40572. 21 C.F.R. x25.21 (1997) reads, \as required under 40 C.F.R.
x1508.4, the FDA will require at least an EA for any specic action that ordinarily would
be excluded if extraordinary circumstances indicate that the specic proposed action may
signicantly aect the quality of the human environment."
46feared that it would be called upon too frequently so that NEPA would \creep"
into expanding areas.214 The FDA iterated its position that the \extraordinary
circumstances" clause is reserved for truly exceptional circumstances.215
The most signicant change in the 1997 revisions was the expansion of the cat-
egorical exclusions. Two new categorical exclusions exempt EAs on all forms
of NDAs if the action does not increase the use of the active ingredient or the
increase will be minute (<1 part per billion).216 The categorical exclusions now
cover any NDA for substances that occur naturally in the environment if \the
action does not alter signicantly the concentration or distribution of the sub-
stance ...in the environment."217 The new regulations also exempts any action
on an IND.218 The regulations contain several new exemptions designed to free
most food additive petitions from NEPA process,219 particularly additives that
are part of packaging.220 The issuance, repeal, or amendment of a food standard
are also subject to categorical exclusion.221 Furthermore, the new regulations
relating to animal drugs largely mirror those for human drugs so that NADA
applications which either will not enter the human food chain or do not alter
the concentration or distribution of a substance are free from EAs.222
The FDA's desire to expand the coverage of categorical exclusions may have
21462 Fed. Reg. at 40573.
215Id.
21621 C.F.R. x25.31(a)(b) (1997).
217Id. x25.31(c).
218Id. x25.31(e).
219Recall that even proposed actions that purportedly fall within one of the categorical
exclusions must included a statement explaining why that action ts the denition of the
categorical exclusion. See 21 C.F.R. x25.15 (1997).
220Id. x25.32(i), (j), (m), (o).
221Id. x25.32(a). A food standard is the denition of identity, quality, and container ll for
food so that a can of peas actually contains peas that meet a certain quality and that is lled
to a reasonable level within the can. See 21 U.S.C. x341 (1999).
22221 C.F.R. x25.33(a)(6-7), (c), (d), (e).
47overzealously excepted from regulation the very categories that have proved
problematic in the past.223 For instance, the blanket categorical exclusion for all
INDs seems problematically broad, especially given the experience with taxol.224
The FDA explains, \the agency's experience has demonstrated that signicant
environmental eects would not occur because the investigational use is limited
and controlled. The dosing regimen for investigational drugs.. results in an en-
vironmental introduction [that is below the 1ppb triggering threshold]."225 In
fact, the FDA addressed concerns about the taxol issue raised in the comments
by reiterating that the Pacic Yew is specically protected by a rule requiring
EAs for most actions involving the tree.226 However, to protect the specic case
of the Pacic Yew alone is shortsighted { the FDA's answer does not address
how the regulations will deal with the next drug that is derived from a limited
natural resource. Indeed, a complete normative debate over these regulations
would consist largely analyzing speculative scenarios in which an action that
is now categorically excluded could impact the environment. Without much
empirical information to analyze, however, whether the FDA struck the right
balance between eciency and protection remains an unresolved issue.
While the theoretical debate as to whether the FDA acted properly in its reg-
ulatory revisions may continue, Congress answered the question denitively. In
light of the new regulations, the eect of x411 of the Modernization Act is
223To grasp fully the import of these categorical exclusions would require an in-depth appre-
ciation of the FDA regulatory scheme that is beyond the scope of this paper. The response to
comments clarifying these regulations occupy 22 pages in the Federal Register, 62 Fed. Reg.
4570-4592.
224See Section IV(C) supra.
22562 Fed. Reg. at 40578.
226Id. at 40573. The regulation at issue was published in 61 Fed. Reg. 58694 (1996) which
was discussed in Section IV(C)
48clear. By stating that an EIS prepared in accord with 21 C.F.R. Part 25 shall
satisfy the procedural requirements of x102(2)(c) of NEPA, Congress was essen-
tially validating the regulatory reforms promulgated by the FDA. Those who
believed that the new regulations were too heavily focused on eciency than
in complying with NEPA were foreclosed from challenging the regulations in
court.227 Though the legislative history the Modernization Act contains virtu-
ally no discussion of this section, there is enough evidence that the eect just
mentioned was precisely what Congress intended. The introductory language
of the new section, \notwithstanding any other provision of law" was included
to indicate that x411 is valid despite what NEPA may require { even if some
of 21 C.F.R. Part 25 conicts with NEPA.228 This evidence is bolstered by an
explicit statement to the same eect by the conference report.229 The report
also approved of the FDA's goals of eliminating unnecessary paperwork and
delays in enacting the new regulations.230 Despite this ringing endorsement of
the new regulations, the statute does not preclude judicial enforcement of the
EAs or EISs themselves and the FDA can modify the regulations as it sees t,
in consultation with the CEQ.231 Other than these minor clues, the extensive
documents constituting the legislative history of the Modernization Act contain
precious little information on x411.232 Indeed, it is not clear that outside of
227This is not meant to imply that there were challenges waiting in the wings that were cut
o by the enactment of the Modernization but merely that the Act ocially sanctioned the
new regulations (i.e. an EDF v. Mathews -type suit is foreclosed by this law.)
228138 Cong. Rec. H8467 (daily ed. October 7, 1997).
229H.R. Rep. No. 105-399 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2880, 2892.
230Id.
231Id.
232See e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-310 (1997) (section by section analysis of the act, simply
restates the section with no comment); 129 Cong. Rec. S9811-9850 (daily ed. September 24,
1997) (major oor debate of Modernization Act contains no mention of this section).
49the drafting committee, the eect, importance or meaning of this section was
understood by Congress.233
The era of regulatory reform has impacted the interaction between the FDA
and NEPA. First the FDA cut back on the extent of its compliance with NEPA
and then Congress accepted those cut backs.234 Initially, it appears that the
FDA has not opened up huge loopholes by which environmentally signicant
action could sneak through the FDA decision making process unchecked. While
the controversies discussed in this paper have highlighted how FDA action can
impact the environment, these cases are the exception not the rule. For the
most part, FDA action has little environmental impact and these regulations
seek to recognize that fact.
233See S. Rep. No. 105-43 (1997) (stating that the new section establishes that no action
taken by the FDA shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment, and EIS, or
other environmental documentation unless the FDA demonstrates that there is reasonable
probability that the environmental impact of the action is substantial and that consideration
of the impact will directly aect the decision on that action). This statement conicts with
the regulations enacted by the FDA itself which clearly require EAs for several categories of
action, regardless of the potentiality of signicant impact, or the eect the impact will have
on decision making. Again, other than this confusing statement, the entire Senate report
contains no further discussion of the section.
234There is another potential motivation behind x411. The conference report, in discussing
x411, states that the \EPA cannot dictate, promote, or encourage a policy preference for
disposal by incineration of metered dose inhalers (MDIs), but it shall allow such contents to
be reused, recycled, or recaptured until Congress says." H.R. Rep. No. 399-105. Essentially
what this statement is referring to are eorts by the EPA to eliminate metered dose inhalers
that contain CFCs so as to comply with the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete
the Ozone Layer. The FDA has taken steps to comply with proposed eorts to phase out MDIs
which contain CFCs. 62 Fed. Reg. 40577. Several members of Congress expressed concern
that this measure might eliminate eective delivery of asthma medication, or increase costs
unacceptably. See e.g., 123 Cong. Rec. E1766 (daily ed. September 16, 1997) (statement
by Patrick Kennedy of Rhode Island); 138 Cong. Rec. H8480 (daily ed. October 7, 1997)
(statement by Christopher Smith of New Jersey). Thus one of the goals of x411 appears to
be to temporarily halt EPA action on the subject and allow MDIs with CFCs to be phased
out as cheap and eective alternatives become available. See 140 Cong. Rec. H8809 (daily
ed. October 9, 1997). Why this meaning is buried in legislative history and not all apparent
from the statutory language itself is not at all clear.
50F. Round 6: The Challenge of Biotechnology and Beyond
One of the greatest regulatory challenges now facing agencies is the increas-
ing use of products designed by biotechnology. Biotechnology refers generally
to the use of advancements in DNA sequencing and gene splicing to alter vari-
ous biological entities, whether it be pathogen-resistant plants or cloned sheep.
Each agency is scrambling in its own right to gure out rst if special regulation
is needed and if so, how to go about regulating these technologies. To discuss
how the FDA does and should regulate biotechnology is a separate topic about
which a great deal could be written. Similarly, to contemplate what role, if any,
NEPA should play in regulating the environmental impacts of biotechnology
would also warrant independent consideration. But the story of how the FDA
and NEPA interact in regulating biotechnology is no story at all { the agency
has not identied any unique role for NEPA separate from the role it already
plays, as discussed above. This decision (or lack of decision) is in keeping with
the role that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identied for
NEPA in regulating areas of that agency's jurisdiction { none. This section
will briey overview the regulation of biotechnology and highlight, through the
example of Bt corn, how NEPA's procedures could inform FDA decision making
so as to avoid environmental harm.
Despite the relatively recent insurgence of technologies that can manipulate
genes, the question of how various agencies should regulate the products of
these technologies was addressed over 14 years ago. In 1986, the federal gov-
51ernment, through the Oce of Science and Technology Policy, published the
Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology.235 The purpose
of the Coordinated Framework was to gure how the overlapping areas of var-
ious agencies jurisdictions should interact to regulate biotechnology.236 Above
all else, the Coordinated Framework sought to avoid creating another agency, a
super-regulator, to oversee the regulation of biotechnology.237 By dening the
scope of each agency's responsibility, the Coordinated Framework worked within
existing statutory structures to coordinate regulation.238 The major agencies
covered by the Coordinated Framework's guidelines are the National Institute of
Health (NIH), the FDA, the EPA, and the Department of Agriculture. Also the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Department of Defense,
the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy play lesser
roles in the guidelines.239 The Coordinated Framework states that NEPA con-
tinues to impose the procedural requirements of an EA or EIS for any agency
action aecting the environment.240 Criticism and analysis of the Coordinated
235Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnolgoy, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (1986)
(\Coordinated Framework").
236The Coordinated Framework states, \[t]he underlying policy question was whether the
regulatory framework that pertained to products developed by traditional genetic manipula-
tion techniques was adequate for the products obtained with the new techniques. A similar
question arose regarding the suciency of the review process for research conducted for agri-
cultural and environmental applications." 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 at *3.
237In 1992, the Coordinated Framework was updated by the so-called \Scope" document
published by OSTP. The Scope document was designed to ll in the gaps of the Coordinated
Framework. In response to a fear that agencies would overzealously regulate anything that
is in some way biotechnological, the document constrains the exercise of agency discretion
in regulation of biotechnology. See Aboulaa, supra note 149, at 609. Importantly, the
Scope document allows agencies to skirt the regulatory process altogether by declaring that
a genetically engineered product is suciently similar to its natural counterpart that it is not
new and not subject to new regulation. 57 Fed. Reg. 6757, 6759 (1992).
238See Linda Maher, The Environment and the Domestic Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology,
8 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 133, 137-38 (1993).
239Id. at 139.
24051 Fed. Reg. 23302 at *5.
52Framework and the overall regulatory schemes for biotechnology have been cov-
ered heavily in legal literature.241 However, this paper will briey summarize
the response of the FDA and the EPA to the Coordinated Framework to outline
how each agency plans to regulate the products of biotechnology.
The FDA's basic approach to biotechnology is that no new procedural or reg-
ulatory innovations are required to deal with the products of biotechnology.
In a document published the same time as the Coordinated Framework, the
FDA outlined a policy statement for regulating biotechnology. The approach is
simple:
Although there are no statutory provisions or regulations that address biotech-
nology specically, the laws and regulations under which the agency approves
products place the burden of proof of safety as well as eectiveness of products on
the manufacturer.... In this notice, FDA proposes no new procedures or requirements
for regulated industry or individuals. Rather, the administrative review of prod-
ucts using biotechnology is based on the intended use of each product on a
case-by-case basis.242
The rest of the FDA statement demonstrates how existing procedures to
regulate drugs, animal drugs, medical devices and food adequately screen for
potential health eects that may be introduced by biotechnology. For instance,
the FDA acknowledges that a food substance which is generally recognized as
241See e.g., William von Oehsen III, Regulating Genetic Engineering in an Era of Increased Judicial Deference: A Proper Balance of the Federal Powers,
40 Admin. L. Rev. 303 (1988); Lisa E. Comer, Genes Made in the USA,
7 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 63 (1988); James Maryanski,
Prospects for the Safety Evaluations of Foods in the United States of America in Connection with Biotechnology,
256 PLI/Pat 243 (1988); Karen Goldman Herman, Issues in the Regulation of Bioengineered Food,
7 High Tech. L. J. 107 (1992); Aboulaa, supra note 149, 15 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 603 (1998).
Generally, these articles oer an agency by agency review of biotechnology regulation, as
well as highlighting some of the major substantive challenges that arise in the biotechnology
context. The consensus among most is that the current scheme does not do enough to
address the issues of biotechnology either because the technologies advance too quickly or
the statutes being used are not designed to tackle the unique issues raised. These articles
explain the role of the FDA and EPA in more detail than presented here.
242Statement of Policy for Regulating Biotechnology Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23309 (1986)
at *3 (emphasis added).
53safe (GRAS)243 may loose that status if it was produced or modied by biotech-
nology.244 However, no unique approach is required to approve a food additive
that is produced or modied by biotechnology, rather, the FDA will apply the
same rules and procedures as it would to any GRAS petition.245 The agency
does outline several detailed scientic criteria that the agency will consider
when reviewing products that involve biotechnology such as rDNA manipu-
lation.246 Fundamentally, though, the FDA's approach to regulation remains
unchanged.247 NEPA and environmental considerations will presumably con-
tinue to be accounted for through the regulations discussed above. The FDA
makes no mention of special environmental considerations derived from biotech-
nology.
The EPA promulgated a similar statement regarding how the agency intends to
regulate biotechnology. The document is much more detailed and substantial
than that of the FDA because the EPA (due to its subject matter) enacted
substantial regulatory and policy initiatives to comply with the Coordinated
Framework.248 For the purposes of this paper, what is essential to the EPA's
approach is that it does not identify any particular role for NEPA in regulating
biotechnology. The EPA bases its biotechnology policies in two statutes, the
24321 U.S.C. x348 (1999) denes a food additive (subject to regulation under x348) in part as
a substance that is a component or comes into contact with and is not generally recognized,
among scientic experts, as safe for use under intended conditions.
24451 Fed. Reg. 23309 at *9.
245Id.
246Id. at *10-11.
247For an argument on how the FDA's labeling procedures ought to be al-
tered when dealing with the products of biotechnology, see Kirsten S. Beaudoin,
On Tonight's Menu, Toasted Cornbread with Firey Genes? Adapting Food Labeling Law to Consumer Protection Needs in the Biotech Century,
83 Marq. L. Rev. 237 (1999).
248Statement of Policy, Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act,
51 Fed. Reg. 23313 (1986).
54Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)249 and the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA).250 The two statutory schemes, directly admin-
istered by the EPA, are product-based regulations that allow the EPA to ban
or limit production and use of certain substances.251 The EPA uses these two
statutes to regulate \microorganisms that will be used to degrade toxic pollu-
tants, leach minerals, enhance oil recoveries, produce industrial chemical, and
act as pesticides."252 As these functions indicate, the EPA is concerned directly
with the release of biotechnological products into the environment. However,
the EPA has not included NEPA in its scheme for regulating biotechnology.
Though the EPA does not directly administer NEPA (since its duties are im-
posed on all Federal agencies) in the way it does FIFRA or TSCA, the agency
could have endorsed NEPA as a powerful mechanism for controlling the envi-
ronmental impact of biotechnological products. Such a statement would have
sent a clear message to other agencies that NEPA's framework should gure
prominently in their regulatory schemes as well.
The current controversy and potential impact of the transgenic corn seed, Bt
Corn, demonstrates how NEPA might have the potential to aid the FDA in its
regulation of biotechnology. Bt Corn is a genetically engineered strain of corn
that contains a gene from a bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis, which renders
the corn resistant to certain insect-pests, including the European corn borer.253
2497 U.S.C. xx136-136y (1999).
25015 U.S.C. xx2601-2671 (1999).
251See Maher, supra note 238, at 158.
25251 Fed. Reg. 23313 at *4.
253See Sara M. Dunn, From Flav'r Sav'r to Environmental Saver? Biotechnology and the Future of Agriculture, Internationl Trade, and the Environment,
9 Colo. J. Int'l. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 145, 151 (1998).
55Last year, approximately thirty percent of corn grown in the United States was
Bt Corn.254 The strain of corn could save one to two billion dollars a year in lost
farm revenue and increased production consistency by two hundred percent.255
However, after Bt Corn was approved by the Department of Agriculture and the
EPA,256 a Cornell laboratory study revealed that pollen from Bt Corn killed the
larvae of Monarch butteries.257 The pollen from the corn spreads to milkweed
plants, a favorite of the Monarch, which often grows next to corn elds.258 The
other potential danger from this product is that insects can become resistant
to the toxin in the corn.259 In response to these dangers, in January 2000, the
EPA announced new restrictions on the use of Bt Corn. The EPA will require
farmers to plant at least twenty percent conventional corn, preferably on the
perimeters of elds to create buer zones, in most regions.260
These profound environmental impacts, which could harm one of the most
important species to the vitality of the ecosystems of North America or un-
leash generations of pesticide resistant insects, were completely overlooked in
the approval process of Bt Corn.261 Whether or not a proper EIS would have
revealed the results of the Cornell study begs the question { the regulatory
254See EPA Places Restriction on Biotech Corn Plantings (last visited February 19, 2000)
<http://www.cnn.com/2000/FOOD/news/01/07/biotech.corn.ap/index.html>.
255See Dunn, supra note 253, at 151-52.
256Receipt of an Application for an Experimental Use Permit Amendment for a Transgenic Plant Pesticide,
59 Fed. Reg. 65358 (1994).
257J. E. Losey, et. al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 Nature 214 (1999).
258Id.
259Plant Pesticides Resistance Management, 62 Fed. Reg. 19115, 19115 (1997).
260See note 254, supra.
261There is some dispute as to what the real world impact of the Bt pollen would be on
actual Monarch buttery populations since the Cornell study was a laboratory setting. See
The World Is Still Safe for Butteries, Wall St. J., June 25, 1999 at A18.
56process contemplated by the Scope Document and the Coordinated Framework
completely failed to identify a potential ecological catastrophe because the issue
was never even considered. This failure could be analyzed from the perspective
of the EPA, the Department of Agriculture, or any other agency responsible for
regulating biotechnology, but what is relevant here is that of the FDA.
Though the FDA seems only remotely involved in Bt Corn, the agency's interac-
tion with NEPA could have played a larger role. According to its biotechnology
statement, the FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety for human consump-
tion of Bt corn.262 Had the FDA applied its regulations enacting NEPA more
strictly, perhaps this approval process would have triggered an EA and perhaps
an EIS. However, since FDA regulations generally categorically exclude GRAS
petitions, no such impact review would have been required.263 Of course, the
EPA and the Department of Agriculture should share the bulk of the responsibil-
ity { as in the taxol controversy, it is likely that FDA should have incorporated
by reference an EA prepared by one of the main regulatory agencies implicated
by the product. But no such EA was prepared and the FDA did not require
one on its own.
It is clear both from the Coordinated Framework and the policy statements of
the EPA and the FDA that the direct statutory and regulatory duties imposed
by the agencies' organic statutes are the mainstay of biotechnological regula-
tion. However, the experience of Bt Corn merely serves as an example of the
potential for the FDA and NEPA to interact successfully to regulate biotech-
262See note 242, supra.
26321 C.F.R. 25.32(k) (1997).
57nology. The two are well suited for this challenge because many biotechnology
products are either part of a drug or food and because NEPA already presents
a statutory framework with which to analyze environmental impacts. Hope-
fully, the adverted danger of Bt Corn will force the FDA, and other agencies, to
reevaluate the role that NEPA plays in accounting for the environmental impact
of biotechnology.
V. Conclusion
The interactions between the FDA and NEPA have had a varied history.
At times the FDA has struggled to nd a place for NEPA in the agency's
regulatory scheme while other times the FDA has appeared eager to advance
the substantive goals of NEPA. What emerges from the history of the agency's
interactions with NEPA is unequivocal evidence that the regulation of food and
drugs can and does impact the environment. Those impacts are largest when
environmental analysis slips through the regulatory cracks. Unfortunately, most
recently those cracks have been deliberately expanded by the regulatory reform
of the Modernization Act of 1997 and perhaps by the FDA's scheme to enact
the Coordinated Framework. The experience of the FDA with taxol, rbST, and
Bt Corn indicate that in an increasingly complex regulatory and technological
setting, even the most innocuous agency actions may have drastic environmental
impacts. That is not to say that the FDA's goals of increasing eciency are
not admirable or even necessary { streamlining the federal bureaucracy is an
58impressive challenge. However, these goals must be kept in balance with NEPA's
goals. NEPA's substantive aims and its procedural mandates are a powerful
tool for ensuring that the each agency conducts itself with some awareness of
the larger potential of its actions. The NEPA framework is inherently exible
to allow the statute to protect the environment across regulatory settings and
dierent time periods. Perhaps the main thrust of the recommended approach
for the FDA in its interactions with NEPA is simply to let the statute do its
work. The FDA should embrace NEPA's function as a gatekeeper. In that
manner, the FDA can ensure not only that our food and drug supplies are safe,
but also that we will continue to live in healthful environment in which we can
enjoy them.
59